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RECENT INCOME TRENDS FOR TOP EXECUTIVES: 
EVIDENCE FROM TAX RETURN DATA
Seth H. Giertz and Jacob A. Mortenson
We examine income trends for top executives, focusing on the years 2000 to 2010, 
with special emphasis on the period surrounding the Great Recession. First, we 
merge Execucomp executive compensation records with IRS tax records. We com-
pare incomes from our Execucomp sample to top incomes reported by Piketty and 
Saez (2003). We disaggregate executive income trends by industry, showing which 
industries are driving the divergence in top executive incomes. We compare our 
results to fi ndings from Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) and Kaplan and Rauh (2010), 
who examine trends in top incomes for broad occupation and industry categories 
for years prior to the Great Recession. We also decompose these income trends by 
income source to see which components are driving the observed changes. We fi nd 
that stock options are by far the most volatile component of executive pay. Options 
are the key driver of both short-term swings and longer-term trends in top executive 
pay. However, stock awards are also a large and growing component. We fi nd much 
greater variation in income across years than across industries. Executive incomes 
are most volatile at the very top of income distribution. In general, trends for top 
executives in fi nance and non-fi nance industries are quite similar; however; for 
those above the 99.9th percentile of the income distribution, the decline in income 
from 2006 to 2009 was much more pronounced for executives in fi nance.
Keywords: executive compensation, top incomes
JEL Codes: H2, J3
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, income has become much more heavily concentrated at the very top of the income distribution. While the top decile has fared better 
than rest of the distribution, the most dramatic changes have involved the extreme right 
tail of the income distribution — i.e., those in the top tenths of the top 1 percent. The 
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recent fi nancial crisis has heightened concerns that the incentives of executives are 
misaligned with the interests of shareholders, or at least the interests of society at large. 
Additionally, there is a perception that while the top of the distribution has enjoyed 
tremendous income gains, incomes at the median (and more generally for the bulk of 
Americans) have stagnated.1
Incomes of high-level executives are frequently used as examples of rising inequality. 
In attempts to better align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, execu-
tives are often rewarded (or punished) based on the performance of the fi rm; however, 
to a great extent, fi rm performance is driven by forces outside any individual’s control.2 
A growing perception is that executive pay is often excessive, not merit-based, and that 
incentives for managers and shareholders are not properly aligned. Some argue that the 
often super-high incomes of executives are to a large extent the product of malfeasance 
or gaming of the system (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009). 
Others argue that executive incomes at large fi rms (particularly fi nancial institutions) 
are artifi cially high due to implicit government guarantees that generally protect bond-
holders against losses and in so doing, lower borrowing costs and encourage excessive 
risk taking (Stern and Feldman, 2004). 
Top executives are highly concentrated within the very top of the income distribu-
tion. However, they likely remain a small minority even among the very top income 
groups. Based on Execucomp data, Kaplan and Rauh (2010) report that Execucomp 
executives comprise roughly 3 percent of the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution. 
Including imputations for executives in non-Execucomp fi rms only modestly raises 
these estimates.3
Previous studies have used executive compensation data (usually required as part of 
SEC fi lings) to examine trends in executive or CEO compensation (Eissa and Giertz, 
2006; Goolsbee, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 2000; Frydman and Saks, 2010). Other 
studies have used tax data to examine top incomes, but these studies usually cannot 
separately identify executives from others with high incomes. Bakija, Cole, and Heim 
(2010) is an exception in that they impute occupations for tax fi lers, including execu-
tives. However, no study to our knowledge has merged executive compensation data 
directly with U.S. tax returns. 
In this paper, we examine income trends for top executives, focusing on the years 
2000 to 2010, with special emphasis on the period surrounding the Great Recession. 
1 The extent to which this is the case depends heavily on how income is measured. Meyer and Sullivan 
(2012), Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon (2012), and Saez (2013) provide examples.
2 For example, Kahneman (2011, p. 205) notes that, “A very generous estimate of the correlation [coeffi cient] 
between the success of the fi rm and the quality of its CEO might be as high as 0.30[.]”
3 Using tax data, Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) report that non-fi nancial executives, managers, and supervi-
sors plus fi nancial professionals make up roughly 60 percent of the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution. 
This is a much broader sample than the Execucomp, and includes many non-executives, executives who 
are not present in SEC fi ling (because they are not among the highest paid at their fi rms), and executives 
at non-Execucomp fi rms. 
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The defi nition of income used is a product of the information available in the tax and 
Execucomp datasets. Each of the two datasets has its strengths and weaknesses; however, 
neither allows for the calculation of Haig-Simons income. For a given period, Haig-
Simons income equals consumption plus the change in wealth occurring in that period. 
Income measures based on tax data deviate from the Haig-Simons standard in that they 
usually cannot account for tax exclusions and tax-deferred income — for example from 
pensions or retirement savings accounts and from some forms of capital income.4 Tax 
evasion also causes measures based on tax data to deviate from Haig-Simons income. 
Some forms of deferred income can be imputed from executive compensation records; 
however, these data also do not capture all income and, as with tax data, some income 
sources are not reported in the period in which the income is earned. Our income 
measures are based on others used in the tax literature. In the following section, we 
describe the sources of income used in this paper, and highlight the timing of income 
reporting. This provides an indication of which sources are likely to yield deviations 
from the Haig-Simons standard.
In the next section, we provide background on our datasets and how they are merged. 
In Section III, we compare incomes from our Execucomp sample to top incomes reported 
by Piketty and Saez (2003). We decompose these income trends by income source to see 
which components are driving changes. We fi nd that stock options are by far the most 
volatile component of executive pay. Options are the key driver in both short-term swings 
and longer-term trends in top executive pay. However, stock awards are also a large and 
growing component — although until recently they were not separately reported. We 
disaggregate executive income trends by industry, showing which industries are driving 
the divergence in top executive incomes. We compare our results to the fi ndings from 
Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) and Kaplan and Rauh (2010), who examine trends in top 
incomes for broad occupation and industry categories for years prior to the Great Reces-
sion. We fi nd greater variation in income across years than across industries. Executive 
incomes are most volatile at the very top of the income distribution. In general, trends 
for top executives in fi nance and non-fi nance industries are quite similar; although for 
those above the 99.9th percentile of the income distribution, the decline in income from 
2006 to 2009 was much more pronounced for executives in fi nance. 
II. CONSTRUCTING A DATASET: MATCHING EXECUTIVES TO TAX RETURNS
We link individual tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service’s Compliance Data 
Warehouse (CDW) with Execucomp compensation records for CEOs plus the next 
four highest paid executives (based on salary and bonus income).5 By exactly match-
4 Tax-deferred income may eventually show up on tax returns. However, a Haig-Simons income calculation 
would require information on income when it accrues (as opposed to when it is realized).
5 For the most recent years, compensation is reported for the CEO, CFO, and the next three highest paid 
executives. In most instances, this amounts to the fi rm’s fi ve highest-paid executives.
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ing executives to their tax returns, we are able to examine the tax information for this 
important and primarily very high-income group. Conversely, we are able to examine 
income sources for these tax fi lers that are not reported to the IRS.
The Execucomp data contain information on 38,500 unique executives spanning the 
years 1992 to 2010. These data are compiled by Standard and Poor’s from proxy state-
ments and 10-K forms (fi led with the Securities and Exchange Commission) and are part 
of S&P’s Compustat database. Included in the dataset are corporations in the Standard and 
Poor’s S&P 1500 Index (i.e., corporations in the S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400, and S&P 
Small Cap 600). The data are primarily a subset of U.S. taxpayers near the very top of 
the income distribution. The compensation information includes salaries, option awards, 
option values, long-term incentive plan payments (LTIP), bonuses, stock grants, and many 
other forms of taxable and non-taxable income. The company information includes total 
assets, market capitalization, earnings, total employment, and other fi nancial information. 
Annual Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use Files (PUFs) have been the most 
important source for tracking trends in top incomes for the United States. However, 
the PUFs remove information that could be used to identify individual taxpayers (or to 
link taxpayers across years). A panel of tax returns was made public for years 1979 to 
1990, but the sample sizes are too small to effectively examine trends at the very top of 
the income distribution. In terms of confi dential tax data, the SOI maintains a stratifi ed 
random sample of tax returns that heavily oversample top incomes. While this dataset 
includes tax returns for executives at the very top of the income distribution, it does not 
sample many with moderately high (as opposed to very high) income. 
The CDW data, on the other hand, include tax returns for the universe of U.S. tax 
fi lers for the years 1996 to 2011 and are only available to a handful of groups within 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Major sources of income (e.g., taxable income, deductions, credits), commonly used 
forms (e.g., Form 1040, Form W-2, and various schedules), and other information are 
available for every return.
Even with the universe of tax returns, matching tax information to executives is 
complex. The Execucomp does not include unique Individual Taxpayer Identifi cation 
Numbers (ITINs), which would make the match straightforward,6 and no single shared 
and unique identifi er is included in both datasets. However, by matching based on an 
array of variables available in both datasets, we can produce exact matches for most 
executives. Because W-2 forms (submitted by employers) are incorporated into the 
CDW beginning in 2000, we have several pieces of identifying information in both 
datasets.7 These include the company EIN and the last name, fi rst name, and middle 
6 For most taxpayers, Social Security numbers double as taxpayers’ ITINs. Taxpayer Identifi cation Numbers 
(TINs) refer to a category of identifi ers (of which ITIN is one), which are not necessarily unique taxpayer 
identifi ers. The Employer Identifi cation Number (EIN) is an example of a TIN that is not unique to each 
taxpayer.
7 We focus on the period beginning with 2000 because our match rate is much worse pre-2000, when Form 
W-2 is not available.
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initial of the individual. Year of birth and sex from the Social Security Administration’s 
Data Master File (DM-1) are also used. After matching TINs to the Execucomp, we 
retrieve tax information from the Statistics of Income (SOI) Databank and Form 1040 
from the CDW. 
For the years 2000 to 2010, our core sample contains 214,500 tax observations, 
120,500 Execucomp observations, and 245,500 total observations (i.e., observations that 
contain tax or Execucomp information).8 We match 89,500 of the 120,500 observations 
(a 74 percent matching rate).9 While individuals may fall out or re-enter the Execucomp 
sample over time (e.g., by leaving a fi rm or dropping in their fi rm’s compensation rank-
ings), the tax data are available for every year in which the individual fi led a tax return 
or had certain information returns fi led on his behalf. 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the company and individual data from both data sources. 
We defi ne executive income (based on Execucomp data) as the sum of the value of 
salaries, bonuses, options exercised, long-term incentive plan payments (LTIP), and 
Table 1
IRS and Execucomp Income (2000$,Thousands):
Sample Size and Means for the Matched Sample
(Exact Matches Between Executives and IRS Records)
Year Observations Taxable Income Executive Compensation
2000 8,636 1,904 2,685
2001 8,637 1,432 1,878
2002 8,685 1,297 1,523
2003 8,789 1,452 1,777
2004 8,092 1,948 2,257
2005 6,983 2,279 2,667
2006 7,411 2,367 2,751
2007 8,037 2,449 2,709
2008 7,783 1,904 2,056
2009 7,404 1,683 1,805
2010 6,971 2,091 2,360
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IRS CDW and Execucomp data
8 Note two sample restrictions. First, tax observations after an individual’s year of death are dropped. Second, 
the record for executives with multiple records in a given year — for example, if the person held positions 
with multiple fi rms during the year — the record with the largest income is kept and the others are dropped.
9 Appendix A provides more details on our matching strategy.
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restricted stock grants for the years 2000 through 2005. Due to changes in SEC report-
ing requirements, LTIP and restricted stock grants are reported differently beginning 
in 2006. We follow the approach of Frydman and Jenter (2010) by replacing these two 
items with non-equity incentive plan compensation and the fair value of stock awards 
after 2005. Based on the tax data, we defi ne taxable income as adjusted gross income 
(AGI) reported on Form 1040 less deductions (the larger of itemized deductions or the 
Table 2
Average Annual Firm and Individual Economic Statistics (Matched Sample)




Total assets 12,900 73,200 24,245,000
Market value  6,220 20,700 11,225,000




Salary    369    248  3,007,000
Bonus    266    992 24,100,000
Options exercised    812  1,049 77,200,000
Non-equity incentive plan compensation    363  5,219 14,000,000
Stock awards    617  1,563 22,700,000
Long-term incentive plan compensation     89    668  4,580,000
Restricted stock grants    255  1,244 13,200,000
Execucomp income  2,220  6,231 17,710,000




Wages  1,993  4,612 16,164,000
Taxable interest     71  1,242     576,000
Taxable dividends    155  2,177  1,254,000
Schedule C income     13    327     102,000
Schedule D income    465  4,658       3,771
Adjusted gross income  2,654  7,816 21,519,000
Deductions    339  1,696  2,752,000
Taxable income  1,849  5,149 14,996,000
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IRS CDW and Execucomp data
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standard deduction) and capital gains (i.e., Schedule D profi t or loss). Adjusted gross 
income is the difference between total income — again, as defi ned on Form 1040 — and 
adjustments (i.e., above-the-line deductions). Note that capital gains are often examined 
separately when using tax data, in part because they are only observed when realized, 
as opposed to when they accrue. Capital gains realizations are generally more volatile 
and lumpy than other income sources, and often the timing of realizations is heavily 
infl uenced by tax changes and the performance of the broader stock market.
In most cases, these various sources of executive income are subject to taxation as 
ordinary income. Firms generally may deduct these expenses in the same period in 
which the executive is required to report them for tax purposes; however, since 1993, 
the deductibility of most “non-performance-based” compensation is capped at $1 mil-
lion per employee. 
The time at which income sources are subject to taxation varies. For example, income 
from salaries and bonuses is taxed in the period in which is it earned. Restricted stock 
grants, non-equity incentive plans, and other long-term incentive plans are also gen-
erally taxed as ordinary income, but usually not in the period that they are issued (or 
in which the incentive is put in place). In most cases, these income sources are taxed 
when they vest.10 Vesting occurs after a set period of time or after certain performance 
measures are reached. Taxing at the time of vesting is similar to the treatment of 
salaries and bonuses, since the executive has not offi cially earned the income prior to 
vesting.
Traditionally, non-qualifi ed options represent the vast majority of stock options for 
executives (Hall and Liebman, 2000). The value of non-qualifi ed options is generally 
taxable when the option is exercised, as opposed to when it is issued or vested. Because 
these options are generally not tradable, they are deemed to have no “readily ascertain-
able market value” when issued; otherwise, they would be taxed at the time of issue. 
The difference between the market price and the exercise price is reported as salary 
income on Form W-2 and is subject to income and payroll taxes.11
III. GENERAL INCOME TRENDS AND DECOMPOSING SOURCES
A. Background on Top Incomes
In their heavily cited work, Piketty and Saez (2003) document a divergence in income 
shares received by those at the top of the income distribution from those in the rest 
of the distribution. Piketty and Saez show that top income shares fell abruptly during 
10 Stock awards that are immediately vested are less common and are taxed in the period in which they are 
issued.
11 By contrast, qualifi ed stock options — a very small component of overall stock options — are not taxed 
when issued or exercised, but when the recipient sells the stock purchased via the options. At this point, 
the realized income is generally treated as long-term capital gains. Qualifi ed stock options are limited to a 
maximum of $100,000 per employee and, in contrast to non-qualifi ed options, fi rms may not deduct their 
value for corporate tax purposes. Bickley (2012) provides more details.
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World War II and held relatively steady for the next few decades. Incomes at the very 
top of the distribution are consistently more volatile, experiencing sharper drops in 
downturns and sharper upticks during expansions. However, over longer time frames, 
clear patterns emerge. Beginning in the 1970s, the divergence of top incomes became a 
dominant phenomenon (Figure 1).12 Excluding capital gains, the share of total reported 
income accruing to the top 10 percent rose from 32 percent in 1973 to over 46 percent 
by 2010. This divergence, however, is primarily driven by the top 1 percent. Whereas 
the share received by the top 1 percent rose by 124 percent over this period, the share 
received by those in the 95th to 99th percentiles rose by 27 percent. Those in the 90th to 
95th percentiles saw their share increase by only 12 percent.13
An important caveat to the analysis by Piketty and Saez (2003) and the analysis 
presented later in this paper is that income shares are measured based on repeated cross-
sections. Repeated cross-sections focus on segments of the annual income distribution, 
without regard to the position of these taxpayers in previous (or subsequent) years. 
Put another way, this type of analysis does not follow the same people over time. The 
composition of individuals within an income group may vary greatly from year to year. 
The question of income volatility or mobility is not our focus, but is an important issue 
that may infl uence normative implications from this type of analysis.14 
There is no consensus as to the primary factors driving changes at the top of the 
income distribution. However, very-high top marginal tax rates coincided with the sharp 
compression during World War II. In fact, in 1942 President Roosevelt called for a 100 
percent tax rate (for the top tax bracket) saying “no American citizen ought to have a 
net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more than $25,000 a year …” (Bank, Stark, 
and Thorndike, 2008, p. 97). Shortly thereafter, the top federal tax rate reached 94 
percent (for income over $200,000). Top rates stayed above 90 percent until the 1960s 
when the top statutory rate was lowered to 70 percent. By 1988, after full enactment 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the statutory rate for top incomes fell all the way to 
28 percent. Thus, the shift towards pre-1930s income concentration loosely coincided 
with the lowering of top tax rates, especially since the 1980s. 
12 While the divergence at the top of the income distribution is well established, the methodology employed 
can affect the magnitude of the changes. For example, using restricted (and not top coded) Current Popu-
lation Survey data, Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon (2012) and Burkhauser et al. (2012) show that 
adjusting for factors such as changes in family structure, income sharing within the family, the value of 
government transfers, and tax exclusions (such as for employer-provided health insurance) generates dif-
ferent results, relative to using the tax unit as the unit for analysis and not accounting for information not 
reported on tax returns. These methodological factors have major implications when examining income 
growth for households in the middle and at the bottom of the income distribution — showing substantial 
gains accruing to the bottom half of the distribution over the past few decades, as opposed to stagnation 
or decline. Under their alternative approach, the degree of divergence in the overall income distribution 
is also lessened.
13 Unless otherwise noted, income shares from the overall distribution of taxpayers are from Piketty and 
Saez (2003).
14 Corak (2013), Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010), Auten and Gee (2009) and Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish 
(2008) examine the mobility of top incomes over time.
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A series of international studies of top incomes edited by Atkinson and Piketty (2007) 
do not rule out taxes as playing a major rule. However, the studies do not defi nitively 
support such a proposition either, suggesting that if taxes are the key factor, their impact 
may accrue over a number of years. Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) present more than 
a half-dozen hypotheses that attempt to explain the divergence at the top of the income 
distribution. One such hypothesis argues that executive compensation is a driving factor. 
Some evidence suggests that the rapid rise in executive compensation may be consistent 
with effi cient business practices (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; 
Gabaix, Landier, and Sauvagnat, 2013; Kaplan and Rauh, 2013; Mankiw, 2013), while 
others argue that principal-agent problems have allowed executives to take advantage of 
Figure 1
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Note: The series is based on pre-tax cash market income including realized capital gains, and 
always excluding government transfers. 
Source: Piketty and Saez, 2003, updated to 2011
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shareholders by awarding themselves lavish compensation packages (Bebchuk, Fried, 
and Walker, 2002; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009), or that recent income divergence has 
been driven by economic rents (Bivens and Mishel, 2013). These competing views are 
also discussed by Frydman and Saks (2010) in their examination of long-run trends in 
CEO compensation.
Kaplan and Rauh (2010) look at the role of executives in the divergence of incomes 
at the top of the income distribution. They further examine trends for executives in the 
fi nance sector as compared to those in other sectors. Using data from 1994 and 2004, 
they report that average realized income for executives in the fi nance sector and non-
fi nance sectors both increased by similar rates — cumulatively, an over 200 percent 
increase — and average income for those in the fi nance sector was about 50 percent 
higher than those in non-fi nancial sectors in both years.15 The presence of both groups 
at the very top of the income distribution increased, but the increase was somewhat 
greater for executives in non-fi nancial sectors. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) further measure 
the contribution of other high-paid groups to the growth in top incomes. These include 
non-executives in the fi nance industry, as well as lawyers, professional athletes, and 
celebrities. They conclude that “powerful CEOs or poor corporate governance cannot 
possibly be more than a small part of the picture of increasing income inequality, even 
at the very upper end of the distribution … [although] this does not rule out the possibil-
ity that poor corporate governance affects CEO pay” (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010, p. 44). 
Many studies have used executive compensation data to examine income trends and 
behavioral responses to taxation, including Eissa and Giertz (2006), Goolsbee (2000), 
Hall and Liebman (1998, 2000), and Frydman and Jenter (2010).16 While these studies 
include sources of income not reported on tax returns, they also omit important tax 
information. For example, several use executive compensation data to measure behav-
ioral responses to changes in marginal tax rates. They generally fi nd that the earnings 
of executives are less responsive to changes in tax rates than are other high-income 
groups studied using tax data; however, executive compensation may be an imperfect 
proxy for taxable income. Several items, such as itemized deductions or income from 
outside the executive’s fi rm, are not observed in executive compensation data. In gen-
eral, capital gains realizations are also not observed. If these are important margins by 
which high-income taxpayers respond to tax changes, estimated elasticities based solely 
on executive compensation data may substantially underestimate overall behavioral 
responses to taxation.
In the remainder of this section, we examine recent income trends for executives, a 
group heavily represented at the top of the income distribution. We compare our results 
to trends for high-income groups more generally, as reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) 
(updated through 2011) and to trends by industry and occupation as reported by Bakija, 
15 The overall growth rate in both sectors is sensitive to their choice of income measure. Income growth 
for both sectors is much lower using an ex ante measure of income. However, under both measures, the 
growth rate is similar for executives in both sectors.
16 Frydman and Jenter (2010) provide a review of this literature as it pertains to CEOs.
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Cole, and Heim (2010), who also examine income trends using tax data through 2005; the 
latter study includes industry and occupation information inferred from W-2 forms and 
the occupation fi eld on the Form 1040. Among those at the top of the income distribu-
tion, they report different income trends for several occupations, including executives. 
This work also relates closely to that of Kaplan and Rauh (2010). 
B. The Changing Composition of Executive Compensation and Top Incomes
Figure 1 presents trends in mean pre-tax income shares over time and decomposed 
by source. This fi gure is based on public-use IRS data compiled by Piketty and Saez 
(2003). Instead of presenting a fi gure for overall tax returns, we focus on the top 0.1 of 
1 percent of returns. As shown later in this section, this group includes a large share of 
top executives — in fact more than 30 percent of our matched sample — and accounts 
for 80 percent of taxable income and Execucomp income in our matched sample. Fig-
ure 1 focuses on the very top of the income distribution; however, the overall income 
distribution is an important component of the measure because income is presented 
as a share of income for the population of taxpayers.  While the focus of this paper is 
primarily on years 2000 to 2010, Figure 1 extends to 1975 for perspective. 
The long-term trend for this top income group is strongly positive, as discussed earlier 
for top incomes more generally. The share of income accruing to the top 0.1 percent in 
Figure 1 averages 6.7 percent and ranges from 2.6 percent in 1975 to 12.3 percent in 
2007. With the stacked diagram, one can see the growth of each income source over 
this period and the relative size of the source compared to the total. For example, in 
2007, when this top group’s income accounted for 12.3 percent of income reported 
by all taxpayers, over 34 percent of this share can be attributed to capital gains (i.e., 
4.8 percentage points) and 23 percent can be attributed to salaries (i.e., 3.3 percentage 
points).
The income share for the top 0.1 percent is extremely volatile. For example, the income 
share rose by over 67 percent (7.3 percent to 12.3 percent) from 2002 to 2007 and then 
fell by more than 32 percent (12.3 percent to 8.3 percent) from 2007 to 2009. These 
wide fl uctuations are driven predominantly by net capital income.17 Capital income is 
both a large share of income in Figure 1 — on average, comprising an over 27 percent 
share for this group — and very volatile. Salaries and business income are also major 
income sources for this group. Combined, these two sources account for more than 
43 percent of the income of this group on average. Salary income has grown roughly 
on par with overall income for this group. Salary income was more volatile after the 
recession of the early 2000s than during the Great Recession. Business income grew 
much more rapidly over this period than income from other major income sources. 
However, a substantial portion of this growth likely represents the shifting of income 
17 Capital gains are closely tied to the performance of the stock market and are only reported when realized 
— i.e., when the taxpayer chooses to sell the asset. A presentation based on capital gains accrual would 
likely look very different and probably be less volatile.
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from Subchapter C to Subchapter S corporations following the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (Slemrod, 1996; Carroll and Joulfaian, 1997; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012).
Figure 2 displays trends in the mean components of Execucomp executive income for 
the years 1992 to 2010. Executive compensation over these two decades is characterized 
by large peaks and valleys. As in Figure 1, incomes are especially volatile in the years 
surrounding the last two recessions. Also, despite a 50 percent decline between 2006 
and 2009, mean executive compensation increased 124 percent over the 19-year period. 
Frydman and Jenter (2010) document the growth in pay for CEOs and other top 
executives since the 1930s. The trends we report in mean compensation from the last 
decade (in Figure 2) are consistent with their trends in median compensation from the 
1990s, in which executive compensation continues a rapid growth trend that began in 
the mid 1970s. Our data show that from 2000 to 2002, mean executive compensation 
Figure 2
Executive Composition by Source: Mean Values from Execucomp Data
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mirrored the business cycle, plummeting 43.9 percent, before rising 130 percent from 
2002 to 2006. Despite an upward trend since 2009, mean executive compensation in 
2010 is down 34 percent from its 2006 peak.
Salary income shows the least volatility and on average grows more slowly than 
overall compensation. As a share of overall executive compensation, salary income 
falls by roughly half over the last two decades — from a 35 percent share in 1992 to 
an 18 percent share in 2010. Salaries increase by 4.4 percent from 1992 to the 2000 
peak. From 2000 to 2010, they increase another 10.3 percent. 
Realized income from stock options is the major driver underlying the overall trends. 
Because this source is not measured when vested or issued, it likely refl ects earnings 
from earlier periods, as well as gains or losses driven by changes in the price of the 
underlying stock after vesting. Not surprisingly, the value of stock options swings wildly 
with the stock market. At the beginning of the period, this source represents 35 percent 
of total executive compensation. It peaks as a share of total executive compensation at 
63 percent in 1999 and reaches a nadir, at 19 percent, in 2009. Despite rising in absolute 
terms by 363 percent from 1992 to 2000 and by 127 percent from 2002 to 2006, the 
value of stock options was up just 55.9 percent on net from 1992 to 2010. From 2000 
to 2010, their value fell by 33.7 percent, on net.
The decline of stock options at the end of the last decade roughly coincides with a 
reporting requirement change adopted by the SEC in 2006. The changes were intended 
to provide a more complete and transparent picture of executives’ compensation, and 
in particular were meant to address concerns over the backdating of options (Borges, 
2012).  These changes, however, complicate the construction of a consistent measure of 
executive compensation across years, as several Execucomp variables were dropped or 
amended, while others were added, beginning in 2006. Among the changes, compensa-
tion that had been reported as long-term incentive plan compensation and restricted 
stock grants are now grouped in other categories. Post 2005, our defi nition of execu-
tive compensation includes non-equity incentive plan compensation and the value of 
(vested) stock awards in their place.18
Non-equity incentive plan payments are primarily cash incentives tied to a fi rm’s 
performance. Prior to 2006 they were mostly a subset of bonuses, and partly a subset 
of long-term incentive plan compensation. Post 2006, non-equity incentive plan com-
pensation accounts for 76 percent of total bonuses (roughly the sum of “bonus” and 
non-equity incentive plan compensation) on average per year. We impute non-equity 
incentive plan compensation going back to 2000 using this ratio. In terms of volatility, 
total bonuses are closer to stock options than salaries. Mean bonuses roughly doubled 
from 2001 to 2006, rising from $310,000 on average to $597,000 in 2006. Early evi-
dence suggests that the Great Recession may be merely a hiccup in this trend, as mean 
bonuses fell to $379,000 on average in 2008 before recovering to $555,000 on average in 
2010.
18 Borges (2012) provides a discussion of the reporting requirement changes.
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Stock awards represent the value of equity awards that are not options and that vest 
within the year. This measure is a more relevant component of annual compensation 
than restricted stock grants, if one wants a measure analogous to annual taxable income. 
Stock awards are somewhat less volatile than bonuses or options, but are a large com-
ponent of total compensation. Between 2008 and 2010 stock awards were the largest 
single component of mean executive compensation, with an average value of $680,000 
in 2010. Average stock awards between 2006 and 2010 ($600,000) were roughly twice as 
large as the average restricted stock grants between 2000 and 2005 ($250,000). It is not 
known whether this represents a shift from options to other stock awards compensation 
(options declined during the Great Recession and have not recovered) or a more direct 
consequence of the change in disclosure rules.
C. Comparing Executives with Similarly Situated Taxpayers
Not all executives have extraordinarily high incomes. Even when looking at only the 
fi ve highest paid executives at publicly traded fi rms, those at the very bottom of this 
distribution have taxable incomes (net of capital gains) that are negative, on average. 
Moving to the 5th percentile, average incomes from 2000 to 2010 were $144,000 — well 
within the top 5 percent of the overall income distribution, but still rather moderate. 
However, the vast majority of executives in the Execucomp (i.e., generally CEOs plus 
the next four highest paid executive at fi rms in the S&P 1500 Index) have incomes that 
are well above the top 1 percent of the overall income distribution. 
Figure 3 shows that taxable income for the 5th percentile of our matched sample 
of executives is generally higher than the 95th percentile of the overall distribution 
of tax fi lers. The 99th percentile of the overall distribution falls below that of the 20th 
percentile of executives ($309,000 average).19 Figure 4 reveals that taxable income at 
the 99.9th percentile (i.e., the top 0.1 of the top 1 percent) is quite similar to that for the 
70th percentile (an average of $1.5 million) of the distribution of matched executives. 
Income for the 99.99th percentile of taxpayers is similar to those at the 90th percentile 
($4.4 million average) of the distribution of matched executives. Taxable income at the 
95th percentile of the matched sample ($7.8 million average) is, on average, over 60 
percent larger than that at the 99.99th percentile of the overall distribution. At the 99th 
percentile (average $21.4 million) of the matched distribution, average taxable income 
is roughly 350 percent larger than that at the 99.99th percentile of the overall distribution. 
Thus, our matched sample is, in general, not only characterized by high incomes, but by 
extraordinarily high incomes. That is, 30 percent of our matched sample is composed 
of incomes that are higher than 999 out of 1,000 taxpayers — with a sizable portion of 
our distribution not having a close comparison group in the work of  Piketty and Saez 
(2003), who do not present incomes for percentiles beyond the 99.99th.
19 All real measures are in 2000 dollars (as adjusted by the CPI-U), unless otherwise stated.
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Figure 3 
Taxable Income for Executives and All Taxpayers
Notes: Dotted lines represent taxable income at points in the distribution of the Execucomp 
Sample. Solid lines represent taxable income at points in the overall income distribution (as 
tabulated by Piketty and Saez (2003)). 
Source: Authors’ calculations from IRS tax return data and tabulations from IRS data by Piketty 
and Saez (2003) 
D. Trends Since 2000
The fi rst decade of the 21st century was an unusual period. The decade began with 
a minor recession in the aftermath of the bursting of the tech bubble. The housing 
and fi nancial sectors fueled economic growth through 2006, after which the economy 
stalled and then was hit by the fi nancial crisis and Great Recession, from which it has 
yet to fully recover. As a result, 2010 pre-tax incomes for most percentiles in the top 
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in 2000. The exception is individuals in the top half of one percent of the distribution, 
who experienced declines in real income. For example, incomes fell (i.e., real incomes, 
not income shares) by 2 percent for those at the 99.5th percentile, by 7.4 percent for 
those at the 99.9th percentile, and by 12.4 percent for those at the 99.99th percentile. 
Despite declines for those at the right-tail of the distribution, trends over the past sev-
eral decades suggest these top groups will more than make up for this decline as the 
economy strengthens.
Turning to our matched sample, Figures 3 and 4 suggest most executives experienced 
substantial increases in real taxable income (again excluding capital gains). In fact, from 
Figure 4 
Taxable Income for Executives and All Taxpayers
Notes: Dotted lines represent taxable income at points in the distribution of the Execucomp 
Sample. Solid lines represent taxable income at points in the overall income distribution (as 
tabulated by Piketty and Saez (2003)).  
Source: Authors’ calculations from IRS tax return data and tabulations from IRS data by Piketty 
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the 5th to 60th percentiles, we fi nd income growth of between 34 and 43 percent over 
this period. Figure 3 suggests executives fared better over this period than did similarly 
situated taxpayers, who in general experienced no net income growth (as tabulated by 
Piketty and Saez, 2003).20 
It is not until the 90th percentile of our matched sample that incomes fall in real terms. 
Average taxable income (excluding capital gains) at the 90th percentile of our matched 
sample is over $4.4 million on average, which roughly corresponds to the 99.99th 
percentile of the overall distribution income distribution. In this case the pattern for 
executives and similarly situated taxpayers is nearly identical. Real taxable income for 
executives at the 90th percentile of our matched sample fell from 2000 to 2010 by close 
to 11 percent, as compared to a decline of about 12.5 percent for the 99.99th percentile 
for all tax returns. Moving up the distribution, the drop in taxable income for executives 
is much larger — and average incomes are so high that no comparable income group 
exists in Piketty and Saez’s (2003) tabulations. At the 95th percentile ($7.8 million aver-
age taxable income) of our matched sample, taxable income fell by close to one quarter 
from 2000 to 2010. At the 99th percentile ($21.4 million average taxable income), the 
decline was over 28 percent.
The coeffi cient of variation normalizes these data to focus on variation (as measured 
by the standard deviation) as a share of mean income for each of the percentiles (Table 
3). For both the IRS and Execucomp income measures, volatility increases for higher 
percentiles of the income distribution. The increase in volatility is much greater for 
the Execucomp measure, where the coeffi cient of variation ranges from 0.09 for the 5th 
percentile to 0.27 for the 99th percentile. For taxable income, this measure ranges from 
0.14 for the 5th percentile and peaks at 0.22 for the 95th percentile.
20 As noted in Section II, this analysis is of repeated cross-sections and thus does not follow the same cohort 
over time. 
Table 3
The Coeffi  cient of Variation for Various Points in the Income Distribution
P5 P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90 P95
Taxable income 0.141 0.129 0.148 0.159 0.174 0.188 0.200 0.214 0.213 0.221 0.223
Executive 
 compensation 0.090 0.115 0.145 0.167 0.179 0.190 0.194 0.199 0.194 0.201 0.229
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IRS and Execucomp data 
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E. Income Trends by Industry
Figure 5 reports trends in mean gross income for Execucomp executives in selected 
industries for 2000 to 2010. Industry codes are from the Execucomp data, while the gross 
income measure (net of capital gains) is from the tax data. Gross income is constructed in 
a manner analogous to Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) and is composed of total income 
(as reported on the Form 1040) less taxable Social Security benefi ts, unemployment 
compensation, state tax refunds, the deduction for self-employment taxes, and long-
term capital gains. Not surprisingly, incomes fl uctuate substantially with the business 
Figure 5 
Mean Gross Income for Top Executives, by Industry
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cycle and both levels and trends vary by industry. However, somewhat surprisingly, 
real mean incomes for many industries were higher in 2010 than in 2000; in fact, this 
is true for our matched sample overall. 
One might suspect that executives in fi nance would have suffered disproportionately 
during the Great Recession. This certainly was the case in 2008: top executives in fi nance 
and insurance reported incomes that were 33 percent lower than in 2007 on average. 
However, by 2009, incomes for this group were above their 2007 level. In fact, Figure 
5 suggests the period from 2000 to 2003 was actually worse for this group: mean gross 
income (at least through 2010) has not returned to its peak in 2000. 
Top executives in real estate, also at the center of the fi nancial crisis, suffered bigger 
losses than those in fi nance. From 2000 to 2006, mean annual gross income for execu-
tives in real estate was 35 to 85 percent higher (depending on the year) than annual 
averages for the full matched sample. In 2009 and 2010, income for this sector was 
about equal to the overall mean.21
Recall that Kaplan and Rauh (2010) compare top executives in the fi nancial and non-
fi nancial sectors for the years 1994 and 2004 using Execucomp income measures, as 
opposed to those from tax returns. Based on the trends in Figure 5, it appears that the 
pair of years chosen for this type of analysis can have a big impact on the results. For 
example, in two of the 11 years in our sample, gross income for executives in fi nance 
is just 6 percent or 7 percent above the mean for our full matched sample. However, in 
three of the years, executives in fi nance report incomes 69 percent to 85 percent higher 
than the overall average. 
F. Income Growth over Selected Years
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report income growth over pairs of years for executives in a num-
ber of industries. The tables are broken down by segments of the top one percent of 
the overall income distribution, as reported by Piketty and Saez (2003). As in Figure 
5, these tables assign executives to industries based on Execucomp data, while using 
income variables reported to the IRS. These tables are analogous to Tables 8 to 10 from 
Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010), focusing on various segments of the top 1 percent of the 
income distribution. Note that Bakija, Cole, and Heim focus on average growth rates 
for periods between 1979 and 2005 for various occupations. By contrast, we compare 
growth rates over pairs of years between 2000 and 2010 and compare executives in 
different industries. The occupation categories used by Bakija, Cole, and Heim are very 
broad, and in many cases are more akin to industry classifi cations. Their data end in 
2005, several years before the fi nancial crisis and Great Recession. 
21 Top executives in mining (not depicted in Figure 5) saw their incomes skyrocket through 2008, as incomes 
in many other industries dropped. This may have been driven by increases in energy prices and the dis-
covery and development of new shale oil and natural gas reserves. 
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Table 4 reports growth rates by industry for executives falling between the 99th and 
99.5th percentile — i.e., the bottom half of the top one percent — of the overall income 
distribution. For this part of the income distribution, growth rates vary greatly across 
years; however, variation across industries is fairly modest. In particular, patterns 
exhibited by both the fi nancial and non-fi nancial sectors (which receive much attention 
in Kaplan and Rauh (2010)) are similar to those of the overall sample. For the overall 
matched sample, income dropped by over 9.2 percent from 2000 to 2002, climbed by 
18.4 percent from 2002 to 2006, and fell by 10.2 percent from 2006 to 2009. By com-
parison, Bakija, Cole, and Heim report that this group’s income increased at an annual 
average real rate of 0.6 percent between 1979 and 2005. While a simple linear trend 
connecting our 2000 and 2010 measures has a slope of about zero, this masks large 
income swings over the decade. 
Table 4
Income Growth by Industry over Selected Years:
Executives in the 99-99.5th Percentiles of the Overall Income Distribution
NAICS 2000–2002 2002–2006 2006–2009 2009–2010
Non-fi nance  –9.2 18.5 –10.2 3.0
Finance and insurance –10.1 18.7 –10.4 4.1
Mining, quarrying, and oil and 
 gas extraction
 –7.3 11.8  –9.4 1.5
Utilities  –9.3 20.6  –9.8 4.1
Manufacturing  –8.9 18.5 –10.2 3.2
Wholesale trade –11.9 23.7 –12.7 6.1
Retail trade  –7.2 19.5 –12.9 4.2
Transportation and warehousing –12.9 19.6  –7.0
Information –10.6 17.7  –9.5 1.2
Real estate and rental and 
 leasing
–12.7 21.5  –9.7 0.4
Professional, scientifi c, and 
 technical services
–10.0 18.8 –10.9 1.5
Health care and social assistance –13.6 15.8  –7.6 7.3
Accommodation and food services  –2.1 11.0  –8.6 6.5
Overall  –9.3 18.4 –10.2 3.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on income from the CDW, industry codes from the Execucomp and 
income cutoffs from Piketty and Saez (2003) 
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Moving to Table 5 and those above the 99.5th percentile but below the 99.9th percen-
tile, growth rates are more volatile, but the overall trend is a good approximation for 
most industries. Once again, the fi nancial sector appears very similar to a composite 
of the non-fi nancial sectors. Variation in income growth across years is amplifi ed 
compared to the bottom half of the top 1 percent from Table 4. For the fi rst three 
sets of paired years, average income growth (or decline) is 50 percent larger than in 
Table 4. 
Table 6 reports measures for executives with incomes above the 99.9th percentile of 
the overall income distribution. While average income in 2010 was roughly the same 
as that in 2000 for most of the top 1 percent, incomes for the top permille — i.e., the 
top tenth of the top 1 percent — were 13 percent lower at the end of this period. In 
other respects, the patterns in the top permille are quite different from others in the 
Table 5
Income Growth by Industry over Selected Years:
Executives in the 99.5th–99.9th Percentiles of the Overall Income Distribution
NAICS 2000–2002 2002–2006 2006–2009 2009–2010
Mining, quarrying, and oil and 
 gas extraction
–10.4 32.6 –16.7  2.7
Utilities –14.2 30.0 –15.4  7.9
Construction –15.7 22.0 –20.5  9.2
Manufacturing –14.2 27.8 –15.8  6.0
Wholesale trade  –8.7 27.2 –21.4 10.4
Retail trade –12.5 30.0 –16.3  7.1
Transportation and warehousing –13.5 28.3 –16.3  2.2
Information –13.8 26.6 –13.0  8.8
Finance and insurance –13.9 24.3 –14.5  6.2
Real estate and rental and leasing –14.2 31.1 –17.1  1.6
Professional, scientifi c, 
 and technical services
–10.5 25.0 –15.3  5.3
Health care and social assistance –10.2 39.7 –15.6  4.1
Accommodation and food services –13.0 19.7 –8.9  12.8
Non-fi nance –13.5 27.9 –15.4  6.4
Overall –13.5 27.6 –15.3  6.3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on income from the CDW, industry codes from the Execucomp and 
income cutoffs from Piketty and Saez (2003) 
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top 1 percent. Variation across industries and growth rates across paired years are 
greatly exaggerated compared to other segments of the top 1 percent. The early part 
of the decade was especially volatile for individuals in this group, who experienced 
an income drop from 2000 to 2002 that was 170 percent greater than the decline for 
those between the 99.5th and 99.9th percentiles. The post-tech bubble recovery com-
pensated for these losses, as the highest permille’s income growth was 55 percent from 
2002 to 2006, or twice that of those in the next four permilles. As with the bursting 
of the tech bubble, the impact of the Great Recession was greater for the top permille 
than for the next four permilles, as average incomes for the former group dropped 
by 26.3 percent from 2006 to 2009, or 70 percent more than the decline in average 
incomes for the latter group. While all segments of the top 1 percent experienced 
income gains from 2009 to 2010, the top permille reported enormous gains of 19.1 
percent. 
Table 6
Income Growth by Industry over Selected Years: 
Executives in the 99.9th –100th Percentiles of the Overall Income Distribution
NAICS 2000–2002 2002–2006 2006–2009 2009–2010
Mining, quarrying, and oil and 
 gas extraction
–54.5 189.7 –26.2   1.7
Utilities –18.3  59.3 –12.5 –23.4
Construction  9.3  78.5 –46.2  –2.4
Manufacturing –18.0  17.8 –16.1  16.9
Wholesale trade –31.8  50.7 –21.3  27.7
Retail trade –23.9  12.7   0.1  –1.9
Transportation and warehousing –14.6  31.2  –1.9  20.6
Information –37.6  18.3  14.0  –9.1
Finance and insurance –30.5  51.7 –42.6  18.9
Real estate and rental and leasing –50.4  38.4 –21.9   2.6
Professional, scientifi c, 
 and technical services
–46.1  39.5 –31.4  45.8
Health care and social assistance –5.3  27.5 –45.6  28.8
Accommodation and food services –21.8  68.3 –25.8  11.7
Non-fi nance –38.4  58.0 –22.7  18.5
Overall –36.1  55.0 –26.3  19.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on income from the CDW, industry codes from the Execucomp, 
and income cutoffs from Piketty and Saez (2003) 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The years 2000 to 2010 were a tumultuous period for top executive incomes, as was 
the case for the broader economy. What are now classifi ed as stock awards have grown 
greatly in importance over this period, and are arguably the largest source executive 
compensation. Stock options are the key source of volatility in executive incomes. In 
“good” years, these options may represent more than one-third of compensation for 
top executives. Despite steep drops in executive compensation in the early 2000s and 
during the Great Recession, executive pay for this group has more than doubled in real 
terms since 1992.
Not all top executives have extraordinarily high incomes. However, the vast majority 
are concentrated at the very top of the income distribution: 95 percent of top executives 
are in the top 5 percent of the income distribution and 30 percent are in the top 0.1 
percent of the overall income distribution. 
Executive incomes, mirroring trends in the broader income distribution, are most 
volatile at the right tail of the distribution. In general, trends for top executives in fi nance 
and non-fi nance industries were quite similar from 2000 to 2010. This is consistent with 
fi ndings from Kaplan and Rauh (2010) for an earlier period. Patterns for those above 
the 99.9th percentile of the income distribution are quite different from other segments 
of the top 1 percent. In general, income swings were amplifi ed for this group and 
showed greater heterogeneity across industries. At this percentile, the fi nance sector 
was an outlier as the income decline from 2006 to 2009 in that sector was much more 
pronounced than that experienced by executives in non-fi nance sectors.
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APPENDIX A: MATCHING SUMMARY
The CDW and Execucomp do not use the same numeric individual identifi ers. For example, the 
CDW includes Taxpayer Identifi cation Numbers (TINs), while the Execucomp includes an executive 
identifi cation number (EXECID). Matches can be made based on names and Employer Identifi ca-
tion Numbers (EINs). However, matching on strings is complicated, as names are not unique and 
some individuals may use nicknames on one form and formal names another. With over 125 mil-
lion tax returns available per year, matching can be complicated and time-consuming. We initially 
select individuals with at least one Form W-2 with Box 1 (earned) income exceeding $99,000 in 
a given year. Our sample is then comprised of all the Form W-2s associated with that individual 
for that year. These W-2 data — which contain between 5 million and 8 million observations per 
year — include EINs and individuals’ names. They are available for tax years 2000 through 2011.
A1. Match Strategy 1
We use two separate, but similar, matching strategies. Both involve creating annual (i.e., year-
specifi c) Execucomp extracts to match with annual (i.e., year-specifi c) CDW samples. The fi rst 
strategy matches executives to CDW data based on the last name and fi rst initial of an individual 
for a given year. Any match (i.e., an EXECID-TIN match) with a confl icting year of birth, gender, 
or middle initial is dropped. We further fi lter these matches in three successive waves. 
Any “matched observations” where the fi rst name, middle initial, gender, and EIN match are 
placed in the fi rst bin. All of the executives found in the fi rst bin are then stripped out of the 
Execucomp sample, and the same match is performed (by last name and fi rst initial, with the 
“confl ict” fi lters) on the remaining Execucomp data. These matches — which are placed in the 
second bin — are subject to slightly different criteria: the EINs are not required to match, but 
the fi rst name, middle initial, gender, and year of birth are required to match.
After removing the executives found in the fi rst two bins from the Execucomp data, the third 
bin of matches is identifi ed using the same match on the remaining Execucomp data. The criteria 
for the third bin are weaker than the fi rst two: the fi rst name and middle initial of the individual 
must match.
All of the matches at each of the three stages are tested for between-year and within-year 
variation in the EXECID-TIN matches. For example, if an executive has three matched TINs in 
the same year, those three TINs must be the same. Similarly, if an executive has matched TINs 
in multiple years, all of the TINs must be the same. If either of these criteria does not hold all of 
the “matches” for that executive are dropped.
As expected, the amount of within-year and between-year TIN-EXECID confl icts increase 
with each successive bin (i.e., more matches are dropped). Similarly, the matches found in each 
successive wave decrease dramatically.
A2. Match Strategy 2
The second strategy matches year-specifi c Execucomp extracts with year-specifi c CDW tax 
data by EIN, last name, and fi rst initial. Matches with confl icting middle names, genders, or years 
of birth are dropped (as in Strategy 1). The matches are then subject to the criterion that either 
the fi rst names must match or the middle initials must match.
As before, EXECID matches with confl icting TINs within a year or between years are dropped. 
In this case, very few observations are dropped. Finally, executives who are matched with the 
same TIN as another executive are dropped. This happens in a small number of cases where 
executives do not have unique Execucomp identifi ers. 
